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Last week, nine months after his inauguration, George W. Bush irrevocably
became President of the United States. No matter what one thought of the
election fiascos, the first political consequence of last Tuesday's attack on the
United States was an understanding that there was indeed a structure of
authority behind which Americans would unite. America, in a crisis of the first
order, was peculiarly in the hands of the President and his administration, and it
no longer mattered how they had got there, but simply that they were there.
Yet Bush's brief speech on Tuesday night inspired few. The nation seized on the
only substantive remark in the address - the announcement that the United
States would not distinguish between the terrorists who committed the attack and
those countries which harboured them - and wondered what it meant. The
speech, along with follow-on statements from senior administration officials,
waffled unconvincingly between the two principal conceptual frameworks of
response: on the one hand, going to war, overtly, covertly, or both; and on the
other, pursuing criminals, under US domestic law, international law, or both. Still
more disturbingly, administration statements sometimes seemed to suggest that
the administration did not comprehend that there might be a difference between
them.
It had all the hallmarks, in other words, of the anti-terrorism strategy that the
Clinton administration had followed for nearly a decade, so evidently in ruins, yet
without even the evanescent but still momentarily consoling Clintonian sharing of
our pain. Tuesday night's speech could have been a moment for Lincolnian
rhetoric, for "treading the grapes of wrath", and the imminence of a "terrible swift
sword". It could have been a time for the clarity of de Gaulle, who understood
that the world is not the same as a domestic legal jurisdiction and that the remit
even of lawyers and judges, subpoenas and indictments, arrests and convictions,
must somewhere come to an end, to be replaced by something else. But Bush's
Tuesday speech neither moved us nor clarified the situation.
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Friday, September 14, marked by the speech he delivered at the conclusion of
services for the dead and missing in Washington's National Cathedral, was the
day that Bush finally assumed the mantle of the Presidency. As a religious
service, it was conspicuously traditional in its scriptures, homilies and hymns.
Bush's message was straightforward: mourn the dead, pray for the survival and
rescue of the living, and be steadfast in carrying war to the enemy. It contained,
fittingly, an oblique echo of Lincoln and the Second Inaugural Address, in which
Bush warned that America had neither sought nor begun this conflict, but that it
was now liable to finish it, "in a way and an hour of our choosing". The service
concluded (as also heard in the service at St Paul's in London) with the Civil War
marching song, "The Battle Hymn of the Republic" - a song whose bellicose
nationalism and religiosity (despite its impeccable anti-slavery credentials) would,
just a few days before, have been considered in strikingly poor taste by
America's fashionably supranationalist elites. The language of just war had, for
the moment, prevailed over its rivals.
But what, precisely, are its rivals? Given the religious origins of just-war
doctrines, it was perhaps appropriate to hear attempts to articulate an alternative
religious view at the prayer service I attended with my family at the United
Methodist Church's Washington DC headquarters, the same day as the National
Cathedral service. Rather than "The Battle Hymn of the Republic", the Methodist
service ended with a young child singing a verse of "We Shall Overcome", with
the words "we shall live in peace".
The preachers struggled mightily to distance themselves from naive pacifism,
while at the same time they proclaimed a vision of peace that was frankly
eschatological - a peace for the end of time, a reign of peace for the city of God the connection of which to the present situation was less than apparent.
It was clear just how far America's mainstream religious denominations have
strayed (principally in pursuing the anti-nuclear campaigns of the 1980s) from
traditional Christian concepts of just war and tranquillitas ordinis, the
maintenance of a just and ordered political society, within which the people of
God might pursue their salvation in fear and trembling, but without pretending
that the fact of an ordered society constitutes the eschatological peace of the end
of time. Tranquillitas ordinis, as conservative Catholic writers such as George
Weigel have noted, recognizes not merely the powers of Caesar but, within
limits, his legitimacy. Preaching instead the peace of the end of days gives the
Church a permanently transcendental place from which to criticize the temporal
order. This has certain uses, but is liable to become utopian pacifism or quietism,
the pursuit of individual, inner peace.
Pacifism is a coherent theological and moral position, but the preachers at the
Friday night service I attended seemed to want it both ways, to maintain the
moral purity of pacifism while still sounding relevant to the real world of conflict,
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sin and death. They recognized the inevitability of armed retaliation, but elided
the question of its legitimacy. They thus deprived themselves, it seemed to me,
of the rich moral frameworks that Christianity, Judaism and indeed Islam have
developed over millennia, frameworks which simultaneously authorize but also
morally limit armed force.
Inevitably the preachers reached, as in other churches across the land, for the
words of Isaiah 2: 4, "they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their
spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war any more." It is curious how infrequently this exemplar of
eschatological peace is connected with the conditions which the prophet
specifies for it to come about: "And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the
mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains,
and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. And many
people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord .
. . . For out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from
Jerusalem."
The conditions of eschatological peace, in other words, are the establishment of
a world order: a place to which all nations shall flow, and out of which shall come
the law. Today, secular elites have embraced their own version of eschatological
peace. It relies on the premiss of world governance, a structure of law that will
bind all nations and peoples, and so finally establish peace. In the world today,
the dream of Isaiah has been embraced by international lawyers.
In the immediate wake of the attacks, these voices were muted. They have
begun to re-emerge, however, arguing that international law provides a
framework for response that the United States is morally and legally obliged to
follow. The essence of the international-law framework as a basis for a response
to attack is articulated by a professor from Harvard Law School, Ann-Marie
Slaughter, in the Washington Post (August 16). Asserting the commonly held
view of professors of international law, she says, quoting the UN Charter, that "In
the case of an act of aggression (a condition easily met in this situation), the
Security Council must authorize an armed response by one or many nations.
States retain their right of self-defense, particularly in response to an armed
attack, but only 'until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security'." The reading that Professor Slaughter
here gives the Charter emphasizes that, even in response to aggression, the
Security Council "must" be the party to authorize an armed response. Selfdefence is seen as a short-lived right to self-protection until the Security Council
shall have taken matters in hand.
This is not, to say the least, the understanding that the United States has taken
of the UN Charter. It is also strangely at odds with the view that many of these
same international lawyers took on the Kosovo war - a US and Nato military
action which could not conceivably be characterized as "self-defense" under the

3

strictures Ann-Marie Slaughter imputes here, and one which was never
authorized by the Security Council. These experts remained silent on the
violation of international law in the Kosovo conflict, apparently believing that, in
this special case, international law had to give way to European and American
moral sensibilities. Why, one may wonder, in that case, but not in this? Professor
Slaughter is careful to add that, if the US cannot get Security Council approval, it
must "at least turn to Nato", for moral, if not legal, approval of US action. But this
position is at odds with international law itself; Nato, however much its members
may regard it as a specially privileged moral organ of the world, is legally merely
a body of collective security, with no special standing in international law that
could substitute for the Security Council.
In current circumstances, when, for reasons of their own, Russia, China and
France as Security Council members have all given assent (for the moment) to
US action, it may be a temptation for the Bush administration to accede to this
process of seeking to legitimize its actions under the international law
professoriat's view of international law, especially given the administration's
evident desire to re-create the original Gulf War coalition.
This would be, however, a mistake of a grave order. In seeking to satisfy the
inflated expectations of international law as seen by those international elites
(whose principal desire is to expand the brief of international law itself), the US
would bury itself - in procedural arguments, fruitless attempts at consensus,
vetoes from militarily irrelevant but morally preachy states, and endless
consultations rather than action - as surely as the Soviets buried themselves, for
other reasons, in Afghanistan.
The coalition that George Bush Snr created for the Gulf War cannot be recreated for the present struggle. Although, in the Gulf War, the principle of
territorial sovereignty was endorsed by all parties, the principals today will very
shortly fall out over how to define terrorism. In the Gulf War, moreover, there was
a clear path to victory, even if it might require considerable blood and treasure;
no one can see a clear endgame to terrorism.
No one can doubt the importance of the assistance other countries can give in
intelligence gathering, overflight permissions, arrests and detentions, shutting
down of terrorist financing, and so on. Yet France is already moving away from
any open-ended endorsement of US military action, Russia has already ruled
itself out as a staging area against Afghanistan, and retreats by other countries
will soon follow. The coalition that Secretary of State Colin Powell seeks will be
built on an unstable combination of countries that will join for some kind of often
oblique quid pro quo. Europe will press for the US to soften its stand against the
International Criminal Court (ICC), which heretofore the US has rejected outright.
A certain pressure is likely to build on the US, not to join - nothing so direct - but
instead to accept that the ICC is the logical tribunal to hear cases against
captured terrorists, rather than US courts. The United States, however, should
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not feel obliged to thank its friends by giving up its own core moral commitments,
should not allow itself to be held hostage to an unstable multilateralism.
Second, Europe is likely to join a coalition in return for the privilege of restraining
the US from actions that it might otherwise take.
European countries will see their role in a coalition - quite sincerely, to be sure,
and drawing from their own considerable experience in dealing with terrorism - as
that of impeding the US from more impetuous action; the same restraining role,
in other words, which prevented the first Bush administration from completing the
job it ought to have done to bring down the Baghdad regime in the Gulf War.
The argument for restraint has practical merits which must seriously be weighed
by the US. What exactly does the US plan to attack that is worth the trouble,
including collateral damage to non-combatants? Is there any worthwhile target
that can be achieved by military forces? What might be the unintended
consequences? (After all, Osama bin Laden himself is partly an unintended byproduct of America's proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.) A healthy
scepticism about what military action can accomplish is an invaluable part of
military planning. For the international lawyers, however, for whom the most
important part of the exercise is not to attack terrorism but instead to use the
crisis as a way to build their quasi-religious venture in international governance,
the argument for restraint will be built around the concept, found in both just war
theory and international law of armed conflict, of "proportionality".
Proportionality is indubitably a crucial moral factor in conducting just war; the
question, however, is "proportionate to what?" It appears that over 5,000 people
will have perished in the attacks on New York and Washington. Does that
suggest a yardstick of innocent civilian casualties that could result from US action
as a "proportionate" response?
It cannot, however, because the US response should seek to minimize any
innocent civilian casualties, since in fighting the just war, noncombatant civilians
may not be a target. The appropriate measure, the one ignored by the Gulf War
coalition in failing to destroy Saddam Hussein's military machine and bring down
his regime, is not the damage caused by the original attack, but the magnitude of
the threat posed. It is this that justifies the level of response -even if, seen in
relation merely to the actual number of people killed in the attack, or the damage
to property caused, the response seems somehow "disproportionate".
It is true that the United States, if it is to conduct just war and not merely war
against these terrorists and their supporters, must adhere to the rules as laid
down in such bodies of law as the Geneva Conventions. It should, however, be
these laws as traditionally interpreted by the United States, and not as
expansively reinterpreted by international tribunals and self- appointed human
rights NGO referees. Those rules do not require, as Ann-Marie Slaughter
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surprisingly says they do, that we "fight soldiers rather than civilians"; they
require, rather, that in fighting whoever fights us, whether soldiers, terrorists or
otherwise, we do not aim at noncombatants and that we minimize collateral
damage to non-combatant civilians and their property, consistent with imminent
and specific military necessity. The difference is fundamental. Professor
Slaughter says that the "coordinated planning and militaristic actions lend the
status of soldiers". This is not the case. As a matter of black-letter international
law of war, these terrorists do not meet the definition of soldiers entitled, for
example, to the protections of the Third Geneva Convention regarding prisoners
of war. The terrorists benefit from no privilege as soldiers under the laws of war,
because, as their declared, actual and systematic method of warfare, they
deliberately and knowingly targeted civilians and civilian objects. They are
therefore, legally speaking, "unprivileged combatants" - to be fought on military
terms with respect to non-combatants in their midst, but if captured treated as
criminals.
What Professor Slaughter urges, along with others such as Michael Ignatieff
(Financial Times, September 13), is not an ethics of warfare at all. It is that the
United States abandon both its rhetoric and preparations for war, and instead
approach the problem of terrorism with a combination of international criminal law
and the criminal laws of the United States and other countries. But the
international criminal law to which Professor Slaughter refers - various treaties on
terrorism, hijackings and hostage taking - has been less than conspicuously
successful in combating terrorism. And it is, frankly, hard to take seriously her
invocation of UN General Assembly resolutions on the subject. These efforts are
bound to founder, because there is no general agreement on what constitutes
terrorism - and, given the profound differences among peoples and their
perceptions of the rightness of differing causes, there will not be one any time
soon.
Likewise, it is hard to agree with Ignatieff that the "most effective response may
not be the instant vengeance of a cruise missile but concerted international
police work that leads to arrest, extradition, trials and imprisonment of the
perpetrators". It is surely clear that the past decade of concerted international
police work has not worked. While no one would disagree that there is a sizeable
role for such police work, it cannot be effective so long as terrorist groups have
safe havens in particular states. The solution to this problem, at least at this
point, can only be military force or its credible threat. The Bush administration
clearly has no interest in Clinton-style cruise-missile attacks aimed cynically at
CNN coverage with little follow-up and ultimately nothing to show for them. A
measure of American seriousness will be the degree to which the administration
can resist domestic pressure for quick strikes in favour of the months of intensive
planning that sustained operations will require.
The only thing recommending the purely criminal-law strategy urged by Ignatieff
has been, up to now, that it did not arouse the passions of Arab populations. This
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was not, however, because these populations thought the criminal-law
procedures and court trials of Western democracies were somehow more
legitimate or just than military action, or covert military action. It was because
such reliance on criminal law alone has been, as we now know, ineffective.
Quiet, unspectacular police work unfortunately failed to prevent the emergence of
a cadre of suicidalists of far greater sophistication and dedication than ever seen
before.
Because, in these circumstances, confronting terrorism requires both police work
and military action, it is vital that the US be prepared to distinguish sharply
between the two, at the levels of both metaphor and action. Ever since the
confrontation between the first Bush administration and Manuel Noriega in
Panama, in the late 1980s, American military excursions have been
characterized by an unfortunate mixing of the metaphors of police work with war.
The characteristic act of war-making in recent years has been, not a concerted
campaign to destroy an enemy's will and ability to resist through its armed forces,
but instead the formation of a military posse, sent abroad to arrest some bad guy.
Thus the first Bush administration sent a posse to arrest Noriega, under a US
indictment; Gulf War propaganda presented the war as a mission to dispossess
the bad guy of his ill-gotten gains; in Somalia, US Rangers went to arrest
Mohammed Aideed under a warrant issued by the Security Council, with horrific
results; in Haiti, US forces entered to exercise police powers, albeit without a
particular person to arrest; in Bosnia and Kosovo, action was conceived as
stopping the crimes of Slobodan Milosevic; and in the wake of the current attack
on the US, military action is conceived of as a posse to hunt down the terrorists,
whether bin Laden or others.
Sometimes, the contemplated military action is literally police work, that is,
arresting someone; sometimes the rhetoric is designed to assure Western public
opinion that their forces are engaged "merely" in police actions, as though this
was somehow less dangerous and more legitimate than making war.
But the differences between what police do in maintaining order and soldiers do
in making war, no matter what the euphemism, is considerable. First, there is the
difference in firepower. Police are armed with relatively light weapons, for the
simple reason that maintaining public order cannot rest for very long on firepower
alone but must rest on the legitimacy of that public order and its police forces.
Military firepower, by contrast, exists to destroy military forces, in which the
greater the ability to concentrate firepower, the better. A city cannot be policed
with tanks and mortars.
Second, while the fundamental task of the military is to destroy forces, the
fundamental task of a police force is to stop criminal behaviour and apprehend
(literally to catch) and arrest (literally to stop) perpetrators.
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Only that level of force is permitted to police. The critical moral difference
between police and soldiers is in this area of the permissibility of collateral
damage and injury to the innocent. Police have restricted firepower principally
because of the risks to uninvolved bystanders and because the person they seek
to apprehend may in fact be innocent. In military operations, however, we accept
morally the possibility of at least some collateral damage, provided that the
military necessity is great enough.
When a war-making operation, conducted by the military, is given the
euphemism of "police action", there is a tendency to overlook collateral damage,
because it is naturally assumed that it has the cleanliness of idealized police
arrests, whereas in fact it may, for example, constitute a full-scale assault on a
city. Conversely, when activities conducted by police are assigned war-making
metaphors, it is a signal that its commanders have relaxed the normally strict
police rules on dealing death and destruction. Confusing the two can also lead to
the mistaken underuse of force in some circumstances and its overuse in others.
In pursuing Noriega, for example, US forces, acting as what they imagined were
police, criminally shot up a couple of neighbourhoods in Panama City with 50 mm
machine guns, on misleading tips that Noriega was hiding out in the area. In the
Gulf War, the operation failed to destroy the forces that then massacred the
Kurds and the inhabitants of the southern Marshes. This was a foolish underuse
of force. The aftermath of that under-use of force against purely military targets,
however, has led to a morally dubious overuse of force in sanctions that
fundamentally hurt ordinary Iraqis.
Simultaneous war and police operations against terrorism have another risk.
As Michael Ignatieff is correct to point out, justifications of war may sweep aside
civil liberties, both for ordinary Americans as well as for those suspected of
terrorist connections. Although politicians of all stripes are being careful now not
to demonize, for example, Arab Americans or followers of Islam as such, such
restraint may not last, or may not make any real difference in how they are
treated by police; moreover, there is already serious and disturbing talk of
domestic security measures such as surveillance of the Internet or national
identity cards that represent a significant erosion of civil liberties of Americans.
These are liberties that, once lost, are not easily recovered.
The Bush administration is obliged, morally and practically, to prepare to make
war. Police work has simply proved itself insufficient, premised as it is on wishful
thinking, on the dream of the world as a unitary domestic society under a
gradually emerging global political order. If the administration makes war, it must
do so according to its constitutional pact with its own people and its own political
community. If friends and allies will join it, so much the better; and if their counsel
is good, including arguments of restraint, it should take it. Yet, however much the
United States might seek to resurrect multilateral coalitions of the past or to
create new ones for the future, it must not allow the present crisis to hold it
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hostage to an alien concept of international governance and overreaching
concepts of international law.
In peace or war, alone or not, supported or unsupported, America will have to
abide by its own counsel and go where it must. It is therefore a time for soldiers
to sing "The Battle Hymn of the Republic", rather than for children to sing "we
shall live in peace", however much one might wish it otherwise.
The peace of the city of God is not today within our grasp, and yet the peace of
tranquillitas ordinis just might be - at least the promise of enough ordinary peace
to rebuild and hold to that which was destroyed, and say to our children in years
to come: yes, here died many innocent men and women; but behold, look around
you, si monumentum requiris circumspice.
(Kenneth Anderson is a research fellow of the Hoover Institution and a professor
of international law at Washington College of Law, American University,
Washington DC.)
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